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On the face of it, the doctrinal lines of disagreement around ‘subject matter eligibility’
inUS law and ‘the invention requirement’, as it is known inEurope, could not be further
apart.The US statute is silent as to what does not constitute patentable subject matter,
while the European Patent Convention (EPC) takes a much more formal approach.
Unpatentable subject matter is listed, categorized either as things not to be regarded as
inventions under Article 52(2);1 or as exceptions to patentability under a small num-
ber of umbrella contexts.2 Professor Burk’s incisive analysis of the two-pronged test of
subject matter eligibility in Alice3 and its place within recent decisions by the SC4 is
monitory in three particular aspects of direct relevance to the many decisions of the
European Patent Office (EPO) on the ‘invention’ requirement. First, the use and de-
velopment of a common denominator across excluded categories. Second, the seeping
of patentability criteria into eligibility. Third, the nascent focus on the language of the
claims that so far the US Supreme Court has declaimed. I will address each of these
points in turn, comparing the direction of legal ideas around patent eligibility in both
systems of law, before drawing conclusions.
THE USE OF COMMON DENOMINATORS
The EPC does not define ‘invention’ but Article 52(2) lists several categories which
are not patentable ‘as such’.The obvious interpretative option given a list of categories
is to define and construe each category in cases with relevant subject matter. For in-
stance, youwould expect some definition of ‘businessmethod’ or ‘computer programs’
1 Article 52(2), EPC is replicated in S 1(2) of the UK Patents Act. See Aerotel Ltd v. Telco Holdings [2006]
EWCACiv 1371.
2 Article 53 (a), (b) and (c). Also see Lionel Bently et al., Exclusions from Patentability and Exceptions and Limi-
tations to Patentees’ Rights, in 1–100; 15/3WIPO STANDING COMMITTEE ON THE LAW OF PATENTS SCP.
3 Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
4 Dan L. Burk,Dolly and Alice, J. L. & BIOSCI., 1, 21, DOI:10.1093/jlb/lsv042.
C© The Author 2016. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Duke University School of Law,
Harvard Law School, Oxford University Press, and Stanford Law School. This is an Open Access arti-
cle distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs licence
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial reproduction and distri-
bution of the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in any way, and that
the work is properly cited. For commercial re-use, please contact journals.permissions@oup.com
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2  Alice and ‘something more’
or ‘mental processes’ or ‘mathematicalmethod’ to be developed in cases that could rea-
sonably be said to involve such subjectmatter.This is in general thepath taken inUS law
wheremuch judicial energy has been spent on defining the outer boundaries of abstract
ideas, laws of nature, products of nature, and mental processes.5
The less obvious interpretative solution given a list of difficult-to-define categories is
to askwhatmakes them suitable for inclusion under the sameumbrella provision. Euro-
pean authorities have long been convinced that it is the requirement of ‘technical’.6 All
the exceptions listed within Article 52(2) are not patent eligible because they are not
‘technical’.This deflectivemove has facilitated focus on the differentways inwhich sub-
ject matter can be said to be ‘technical’ and therefore patentable. Significantly ‘techni-
cal’ as a freestanding, fairly neutral idea also removes the need to explore the normative
foundations of the list of exceptions in Article 52(2).
The EPOnow considers mathematical formulae implemented by computer simula-
tion as amodern ‘technical’ method even if the invention does not incorporate a physi-
cal end product.7 Businessmethods are exceptions to patentability under the EPC8 but
if such applications include claims that specify computers, computer networks, conven-
tional programmable apparatus, or even a storage medium carrying the program then
because it is amixof technical andnon-technical features,9 the claimwill be examined as
a ‘computer-implemented invention’. In other words, the use of general purpose appa-
ratus or even a flash drive that executes some steps of a businessmethod schememeans
the invention has acquired the all-important ‘technical character’. Additionally, while
computer programs are exceptions to inventions, a ‘computer-implemented method’
is not10 and is examined distinct from the computer program corresponding to that
method. When combined with a ‘technical’ requirement that is evanescent at one end
of the spectrum and mundane at the other, one can de facto get a comfortable degree
of protection around a computer program under European law.
TheUK hasmaintained an eroding bulwark11 against this approach, despite a statu-
tory requirement to harmonize examination practice with the EPO. Following the
four-step test formulated by the UK Court of Appeal in Aerotel, under Article 52(2)
claimed inventions that can be said to fall ‘as such’ within one of the exceptions are not
patentable even if it fulfills the technical requirement in one of themany ways specified
by the EPO. At the EPO the questions are differently ordered. If the claimed inven-
tion is technical, the fact that it also falls into one of the excepted categories is not an
impediment to patentability.12
5 The USPTO memo Formulating a Subject Matter Eligibility Rejection and Evaluating the Applicant’s Re-
sponse to a Subject Matter Eligibility Rejection (May 4, 2016) is a clear exemplar arising from this approach,
http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ieg-may-2016-memo.pdf (last accessed July 5, 2016).
6 The ‘technical’ requirement cannot be traced to a single statutory provision in the EPC but surfaces in Rules
42(1)(a) and (c) and Rule 43(1) of the Implementing Regulations of the European Convention on the Grant
of Patents; and is nowaccepted by theEPO’s patent ExaminationGuidelines as a further ‘implicit’ requirement
of patentability. See EPO Patent Examination Guidelines, Part G.
7 T-1227/05 (Schaltkreissimulation I / INFINEONTECHNOLOGIES) 2006.
8 Article 52(2) (c) ‘Schemes, rules and methods for performing mental acts, playing games or doing business’.
9 For instance, see T-0424/03 (Clipboard formats I/MICROSOFT).
10 G3/08 (Referral by the EPO in relation to a point of law).
11 Aerotel, supra note 1, and Symbian Ltd’s Application [2009] RPC 1. But also see AT&T Knowledge Ven-
tures/Cvon Innovations v. Comptroller General of Patents [2009] EWHC 343 (Pat).
12 See supra note [10].
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Alice and ‘something more’  3
ToaEuropean patent lawyer therefore the two-pronged test inAlicewill feel familiar
because it parallels what I call the common denominator approach, where a relatively
content-free concept unburdened by normative principles13 is introduced whose pres-
ence allows subjectmatter to escape one of the ineligible categories. According toAlice,
if ‘the claimed invention involves a prohibited category then under the second prong
of the test analysis shifts to whether the inventor has added “something more” which
might constitute an “inventive concept” beyond an abstract idea, law of nature or (pre-
sumably) a product of nature.’ The cognitive shift here is to move away from trying to
demarcate what is or is not a ‘law of nature’ or ‘abstract idea’, or ‘product of nature’ and
focus instead on the positive presence of some, as yet undefined, inadequately explored
positive requirement—‘something more’.
Contrary to what Professor Burk ventures, if we speculate that bothMyriad cDNA
and gDNA (not just gDNA) fit one of the prohibited categories, namely product of na-
ture, they must then be considered under the second prong. Informed by the doctrinal
evolution of the ‘technical’ test in European patent law and the common denominator
lens, it is possible to come up with a different view of how the second prong may in
fact fit the analysis inMyriad. If cDNA fulfills ‘something more’, we have to assume it
is not because of the ‘isolation’ from nature test which, unlike US law, remains central
to what makes discoveries eligible for patents in Europe.14 When discoveries become
patentable inEuropean law(because theyhavebeen isolated fromnatureor some ‘tech-
nical’ process has been applied to them), they become eligible even if the method of
putting them to use is not novel or is obvious.15 So cDNA being a product of ‘the most
unimaginative and routine laboratory procedures’ can from this perspective still fulfill
the ‘something more’ requirement.
In fact discoveries in European law—the closest category to ‘product of nature’—
are treated as ‘soft exclusions’.16 Although on the face of it you cannot patent your dis-
covery, you can patent a useful artifact or process that you were able to devise once you
had made your discovery. In other words the discovery itself being the new and inven-
tive feature of the invention, the ‘technical requirement’ (the ‘something more’), can
be met by routine features of the inventions.
Applying the same approach, it is just as likely that gDNA does in fact pass the first
prong, carried there by ignoring the structural differences of the gDNAmolecule from
those found in the cell, just as the deletion of the introns are ignored in the case of
cDNA.The informational identity with native DNA ensures however that gDNA fails
at the second prong and does not meet the ‘something more’ requirement. This read-
ing does not bring us closer to understanding what distinguishes a product of nature
from one that is not because of the ‘diametrically opposed readings of the importance
of differences in structure or coding’.17 Speculating that both gDNA and cDNA fall or
fly based on the second prong of the test, however, ideationally closes the doctrinal gap
between how patent eligibility is approached in US and European law.
13 A fair inference given that the pre-emption question is treated as inherent inAlice’s two-part framework in both
OIP Technologies v. Amazon, 788 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2015) and Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom Inc.,
788 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
14 Article 3(2)Directive 98/44/ECon the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions [1998]OJ L213/13.
15 CFPH LLC [2005] EWHC 1589 (Pat).
16 A term first used by Prescott J in id.
17 Burk, supra note 4, at [4].
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4  Alice and ‘something more’
PRIOR ART AND INHERENT PATENTABILITY
There are times when the technical character test conflates the invention requirement
with patentability,18 much as ProfessorBurk fearsmayhappen given the ‘inventive con-
cept’ content being mooted for the second prong of the two-step test in Alice. In EPO
practice the technical requirement threshold tends to be met fairly easily and the anal-
ysis then shifts to the inventive step wheremost trivial inventions ought to fail the non-
obviousness criterion. In the UK, because the technical requirement test is applied in
a more robust way, perversely it can lead to subject matter analysis doing the work of
patentability.
In Lantana Ltd v The Comptroller General of Patents, Design and Trade Marks19 the
UK Court of Appeal rejected claims to a data transfer method that was essentially a
file retrieval system based on email because it made no technical contribution. In sub-
stance, this was because the claim was held to relate to software running on conven-
tional computers connected by a conventional network. Transmission of data on the
internet was part of the prior art, and the invention was held to fall under excluded sub-
ject matter. No novelty or inventive step objection was raised by the UK Intellectual
Property Office.
Part of the problem arises from the second step of the Aerotel decision which re-
quires identifying ‘the contribution’ made by the invention. ‘It is an exercise in judge-
ment probably involving the problem said to be solved, how the invention works, what
its advantages are. What has the inventor really added to human knowledge, best sums
up the exercise.’20 This formulation of the test, and the way it was applied in Lantana,
appears to co-opt prior art in deciding ‘what has been added to human knowledge’ and
this could well be echoed in the ‘inventive concept’ test arising from Alice.
Theconfusion between the eligibility or the invention requirement and questions of
novelty and inventive step is indicative of the ambiguous doctrinal content of this ques-
tion21 in both systemsof law. In theEuropean systemhard cases on inherent patentabil-
ity raise difficult-to-answerquestions relating toboth thenormativebasis of the require-
ment for inherent patentability and the nature of the requirement itself.22 Going by the
European experience, the temptation to draw on other parts of the patent statute will
be difficult to resist.
Historically, a critical juncture in Europe on the invention requirement came with
themove from ‘technical contribution to the knownart’ to ‘technical character’ or ‘tech-
nical effect’ in the years following the failed patentability Directive in Europe.23 One
version of the so called ‘contribution’ approachmade location of the inventive step piv-
otal to the question of patent eligibility—if it resided in the excluded subject matter
18 Overtly the Enlarged Board of the EPO has made clear that technical character should be assessed without
regard to the prior art but this can be difficult to achieve, and has not always been the case. G3/08.
19 [2014] EWCACiv 1463.
20 Aerotel, supra note 1, at [43].
21 Burk, supra note 4, at [17].
22 ‘In particular they illustrate the difficulty not only in identifying what makes a subject matter (for example)
technical, but also in stating with confidence that inventions are technical, andwhy the properties constitutive
of a technical process or artefact establish a subjectmatter’s inherent suitability for a patent.’ JUSTINEPILA, THE
REQUIREMENT FOR AN INVENTION IN PATENT LAW, (2010).
23 COM (2002)/0047/COD Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the
patentability of computer-implemented inventions.
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Alice and ‘something more’  5
(non-technical subject matter) the invention was not patentable; if the inventive step
was located in technical subject matter, then it was patentable.24 The use of ‘technical’
not unsurprisingly led directly to some of the most entrenched disagreements about
patent eligibility in European law. In Aerotel, Justice Jacob details at least six different
approaches to the interpretation of Article 52(2) including one that he termed as ‘sim-
ply not intellectually honest’.25
CLAIM LANGUAGE
There are many strands to the technical effect or character test but in its present form
it attempts to steer clear of novelty and inventive step by distinguishing between the
‘technical’ elements and the ‘non-technical’ elements. The eligible invention is only
patentable if the technical elements are novel and inventive. Applying the common de-
nominator lens to ‘something more’, a key question for future decisions will be, once
an invention passes the second prong of the Alice test, whether novelty and inventive
step will be applied to the invention as a whole including the patent ineligible elements
or only to the ‘something more’ or the part that supplies the ‘inventive concept’. Un-
der European law the two elements of the invention are treated differently, spawning a
fractured approach to claim language that puts the draftsman’s skill center stage.
At theEPO, as amatter of examination practice, the separation of technical and non-
technical elements does not end with just the eligibility question but flows through to
the inventive step question.Where the elements are mixed, each feature is evaluated to
see if it contributes to the technical character of the claimed subject matter, which then
becomes a matter to be assessed under inventive step.
A step-by-step analysis of technical and non-technical elements is likely to impact
on drafting to ensure that the inventive elements of the inventions are tied as directly
as possible to the technical elements of the invention.26 If the EPO finds that excluded
subject matter has been included in the claims making it impossible to search prior art,
then it can invite applicants to make a statement indicating the subject matter to be
searched27, providing further opportunity for the applicant to direct the EPO to the
technical elements in the claims.
Minssen and Schwartz’s introduction of the Federal Circuit’s decision in
Sequenom28 into our discussion29 is an opportunity to further demonstrate how Euro-
pean law has relied on claim language to further the technical requirement and in the
process hollow out exceptions and exclusions. There are two hypothetical objections
to inherent patentability in Europe given the patent application in Sequenom—that the
main claim is a discovery or that many of the subsequent claims are in essence claims
to diagnostic methods that are explicitly excluded in the EPC in Article 53.
24 Aerotel, supra note 1, at [26].
25 Id. at [27].
26 Rule 43(1) of the Implementing Guidelines says ‘Claimsmust be drafted in terms of the “technical features of
the invention”’.
27 Rule 63 Implementing Guidelines.
28 Ariosa Diagnostics Inc. v. Sequenom Inc., 788 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
29 T.Minssen & R. Schwartz, Separating Sheep fromGoats: A European View on the Patent Eligibility of Biomedical
Diagnostic Methods, J. L. & BIOSCI., 1, 8, DOI:10.1093/jlb/lsw019.
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6  Alice and ‘something more’
As the authors point out in the parallel Technical Board of Appeal decision on the
same application, inherent patentability was not even in question.30 However, had the
objection been raised, the central discovery here is unlikely to have faced a serious
threat to patentability because it remains a ‘soft exclusion’.The second hypothetical ob-
jection lies in the reasonable description of some of the claims as ‘diagnostic methods’.
Diagnostic methods for humans and animals have a long history of being prohibited
from patentability in Europe.31 EPO practice requires these to be claimed using ‘diag-
nostic method steps’—broadly, the examination phase, comparison, finding of signifi-
cant deviation, and the decision phase.32
TheExaminationGuidelines stipulate that the claimsmust include all of thesephases
in order to be a true ‘diagnosticmethod’ (and therefore not patentable).There is a triple
negative here that is put to great use—‘if all the phases are not present then it is not a
diagnostic method and is therefore not excluded’. To patent a diagnostic method, all
you have to do is avoid these phases in sequence in the claims, which will not be hard
to do as they are in fact a construct that can be sidestepped by the patent applicant
either by showing that not all the stipulated phases are reflected in his claim33 or by
showing that even though all the phases are present in his claim one or more of them
are ‘not practiced on/performed on/do not interact with a human or animal body’;34
or amount to a ‘technical’ phase.The result is the creation of multiple loopholes in the
law that can be exploited by all but the most unskilled patent draftsman.35
CONCLUSION
To a European patent lawyer the ‘something more’ of Alice is comfortingly familiar—
not because it is the path to greater clarity but because the confusion following in the
wake of the technical requirement has been with us for so long.There is nothing as yet
to suggest that the US SC will fully embrace what I have termed the ‘common denom-
inator’ approach, or that such an embrace will inevitably lead to conflation with nov-
elty and inventive step or a lamentable reliance on claim language. But it seems likely.
So, far from threatening the global convergence of patentability standards,36 I believe
the common denominator approach gives us access to an alternate coherence: a vision
where two systems of law that could not be more different on the face of it are being
driven to similar analytical mechanisms because both have failed to lay the normative
foundations of patent eligibility.
30 Case T-146/07 of Dec. 13, 2011 (Non-invasive prenatal diagnosis/ISIS INNOVATION LTD).
31 It mirrors the history of the exclusion of methods of medical treatment. See T. Piper,ACommon Law Prescrip-
tion for a Medical Malaise, in THE COMMON LAW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF DAVID
VAVER 143, 160 (CatherineWai-Man Ng, Lionel Bently and Giuseppina D’Agostino eds., 2010).
32 Paragraph 4.2.1.3 of the Examination Guidelines, http://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-texts/html/
guidelines/e/g ii 4 2 1 3.htm (last accessed July 5, 2016).
33 In G1/04 OJ 2006, 334 the Enlarged Board felt there was no risk of this because Article 84 EPC requires an
independent claim to recite all the essential features which are necessary for clearly and completely defining
an invention [6.2.4].
34 Id.
35 I discuss how text in claims can be manipulated to generate the legitimacy of patentability standards in Textu-
alisation as Mode of Persuasion in Patent law andWhat it Means for Legitimacy, 7 LSE L., SOC’Y & ECON.WORK-
INGPAPER (2015), https://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/law/wps/WPS2015-07 Thambisetty.pdf (last accessed
July 5, 2016).
36 Minssen & Schwartz, supra note 29, at [6].
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